I'll leave you with this, the RAF & Bomber Command made huge tactical mistakes in WWII. EG: Concentrating on bombing Berlin instead of other strategic area in the Ruhr.. like coal producing facilities.
'They expect the German war economy to be crippled in the winter of 1943 and the reason why that doesn’t happen is that the RAF turns its attention from the west of Germany to Berlin, and makes a vain attempt to destroy Berlin. However, Berlin is an inappropriate target. It’s too large, it’s too far away and it’s at the end of the productive chain, whereas the Ruhr stands at the very beginning because it’s the centre of German coal mining, without which the heavy industrial economy of Germany grinds to a halt.
And the Germans are deeply puzzled why the British make this move. And in the autumn of 1944 and into the spring of 1945 when the attacks on the Ruhr are resumed and focused on the shunting yards which are necessary to move the coal around they have an immediate and absolutely dramatic effect on the German war economy.'
Brit vanity got in the way of tactical targets. 25lbs of boost is very small in the overall picture.
It's true to an extent, although you take a very simplistic view. There are many reasons why Bomber Command and the 8th AF caused coal shortages in 1944, and really began to hurt the economy. Keep in mind when the Battle of Berlin began.
For a start, 1944 was when Bomber Command really began to excel at its trade. They had Gee, H2S, pathfinder tactics, Mosquitos, Master of Ceremony Bombers, better nav equipment and methods, higher capacity bombs and different bomb loads which were better at taking out buildings. In 1944, the technology was not ready, in its infancy, or the tactics being developed. These made huge differences to BC's effectiveness, who at the start of the war managed something like 3 bombs in every hundred get within a mile or two of the target (don't quote me on that, but it's a similar level of innacuracy.)
Second is the background to Strategic Bombing. In the interwar period, a major prevalent thought, particularly adopted by the UK and US was that bombers would deliver a decisive knockout blow to the capital of the enemy, or major industries. In a way, it generated its own momentum. People feared the idea of the bomber, assumed they would be bombed and so should produce a bigger bombing force to deliver their blow first. A bit like MAD of the cold war. BC got the lion's share of RAF interwar funding. As AM Harris argued a lot, it was a strategy that had never been persued nor given adequate resources to do. Nonetheless, a lot of people theorised about bombing in the interwar period; in a way it was enevitible that the UK would give bombing Berlin a go, when they could.
Third is the political background. Russia had taken a huge pounding, and only just scraped through in 1941 and 42. In the midst of deep German drives into Russian heartland, and the allies dithering (to stalin's mind) in North Africa, Stalin pressed heavily for a more even contribution to the alliance from his Western counterparts. Church won him around by raising the strategic bombing idea and promising it would become another front in its own right. It would cripple Germany, break their spirit, divert resources from the East and generally relieve pressure. Hence the combined offensive and then battle of Berlin.
4th is the battle of the Ruhr. The allies were getting hammered during it, the Ruhr basin was probably the most heavily defended (flak-wise) place in the world at the time. The germans had highly efficient compared to its contemporaries radar-guided flak systems, a night fighter doctrine which worked supremely, schrage-musik cannon etc. For all the battering delivered to the Ruhr, intelligence at the time suggested industry was not about to collapse, nor morale in the area. The germans were very good at fixing damage to their factories, and it seemed like the Ruhr wouldn't work. Another target needed considering, and I refer you back the second point. Hindsight's a wonderful thing now, of course...
5th is the state of Germany. Germany in 1939 was innefficient in production in 1939. One factory took something like 60 men to produce 1,000 rounds of ammunition. Another toook 3. Speer was very good at rationalising and making more efficient production methods, hence a continual increase in output till 1944, where it finally plateaued out. By the time of the Battle of Berlin starting, one of the other things Speer had done was successfully disperse industry as well. It was not all concentrated in huge industrial centres but spread out all over the place. Bombing the large cities, assuming the aircrew hit them at all, was less effective. In 1944, what really crippled Germany was as you mentioned, the railheads. In 1944, the combind bomber forces, when they weren't working for SHAEF before, during and after Op Overlord, targeted infrastructure a lot more. This is what did it. German coal mines often had huge stocks of coal, but could do nothing with them because of the transport problems. As a result, there were rolling blackouts over christmas, people were given an extra day's holiday to save energy etc. Added to this was the fact that the Luftwaffe was more or less rolled up by escort fighters, which broke caused huge attrition of the desperately needed experienced airmen, which would also allow the bombers to operate more effectively.
There are many reasons therefore that explain away a lot of the huge increase in the effectiveness of bombing in 1944 compared to 1943. That said, you're right, the Battle of Berlin was probably a waste of effort, but on the other had, it's unlikely that bludgeoning the same targets would be much more effective. Hindsight of course is a wonderful thing, though.
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